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This thesis shows that a combination of "bracket 
creep" and legislated tax rate increases during the Edmund 
G. “Pat” Brown and Ronald Reagan governorships caused 
individual marginal tax rates to increase as much as 600 
percent. A person earning $20,000 in 1958 was in the three 
percent bracket for state income taxes.  Assuming this 
person received no real pay raises, his inflation-adjusted 
income in 1977 was now $41,938 and his marginal tax bracket 
was 11 percent.  This person experienced a 355 percent 
increase in his marginal tax rate.   
The deadweight loss calculations show how bracket 
creep and legislated tax rate increases exacerbate 
deadweight loss.  The more revenue the federal or state 
government tries to collect, the more deadweight loss 
society as a whole incurs.  Using elasticities (of taxable 
income with respect to tax rates) ranging from .3 to 1.0, 
the incremental deadweight loss as a percent of incremental 
revenue collected ranged from 10.6 percent for an 
elasticity of .3, to as high as 35.53 percent for an 
elasticity of 1.0.  The deadweight loss calculations show 
that for every dollar in revenue collected, at least 10.7 
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This thesis studies the California income tax system 
from 1935 to 2001—specifically, the marginal tax rates at 
various real-income levels, taking into account the 
interaction between the state and federal tax systems. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis explains and answers the following 
questions: 
• Why are California’s income tax rates so high? 
• How has inflation affected marginal income tax 
bracket creep? 
• What is the deadweight loss (the loss to society) 
caused by high tax rates? 
C. DISCUSSION 
One of the major factors affecting economic activity 
in a location is that location’s tax system.  All other 
things equal, the lower the tax rate in an area, the more 
attractive the area is for economic activity.  This matters 
for location across states because movement from one state 
to another is relatively low cost.  The fact that workers 
can move from California to Nevada, for example, means that 
wages net of taxes will tend to equalize, which means that 
wages net of taxes will tend to be higher in the high-tax-
rate state.  This fact, in turn, means that production will 
be more expensive in the high-tax state.  This is 
particularly relevant for defense production—and even for 
location of military bases—because the Department of 
Defense (DoD) often has the option of choosing one state 
over another. 
  1
It becomes important, therefore, to understand the tax 
systems of various states.  California’s tax system is 
particularly important to understand because California’s 
economy is the fifth-largest in the world. [Ref. 1]   
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis includes: (1) historical income tax tables 
from 1935 to 2001; (2) a narrative of three time periods in 
California’s history—Governors Earl Warren’s, Pat Brown’s 
and Ronald Reagan’s administrations; (3) an inflation 
adjustment to the tax tables showing bracket creep and the 
impact on marginal tax rates for the people at various real 
income levels; and (4) an estimate of the deadweight loss 
of California’s income tax system, based on California 
taxes and on the interaction between the state and federal 
tax systems. 
E. METHODOLOGY  
• Compile California income tax tables from 1935 to 
2001. 
• Provide an historical perspective on California 
state taxes. 
• Calculate income tax rate bracket creep. 
• Use elasticities of taxable income with respect 
to tax rates to calculate deadweight loss from 
high tax rates. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter II provides the background for this thesis by:  
(1) describing the income tax system and how it has 
evolved; (2) providing historical income tax tables from 
1935 to 2001; (3) providing an historical narrative of 
three governors, their tenures, and their effect on taxes; 
and (4) adjusting tables for inflation (bracket creep).  
Chapter III calculates the deadweight loss from the 
  2
California state income tax system.  Chapter IV states a 
conclusion. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF CALIFORNIA’S STATE INCOME 
TAXES 
A. BACKGROUND 
Prior to 1935, local governments in California relied 
primarily on property taxes for revenue.  The Great 
Depression of the 1930s was the single most significant 
event that led to adoption of sales and state income taxes.  
During the Depression, property owners found it 
increasingly difficult to pay their property taxes and 
sought relief by way of a voter referendum to change 
existing property tax laws.   
Elementary and secondary school expenditures were 
mandated by the state and paid with local property taxes.  
If property tax relief were to occur, the state would have 
to bear more of the fiscal burden.  Proponents of property 
tax relief included Proposition 9 on the general election 
ballot of 08 November, 1932. The bill, if passed, would 
have provided property tax relief, but also would have 
permitted the introduction of sales and personal income 
taxes. [Ref. 2:p. 59]   Proposition 9, which was poorly 
worded, was defeated by a vote of 1,144,449 to 552,738.  
In 1933, the Great Depression was in full swing.  
California’s general fund surplus, funded by a gross 
receipts tax on utilities, was depleted, and the state’s 
first deficit was growing. Something had to be done.  The 
governor’s ideas for fiscal recovery fell on deaf ears.  
Meanwhile, the legislature drafted its solution, the Riley-
Stewart initiative.  
  5
 
The Riley-Stewart initiative, which the voters 
approved in a special election on 27 June 1933, 
had four main components: public utility property 
was to be returned to local property tax rolls 
and the gross receipts tax abolished in 1935; the 
state would provide additional support for 
elementary and secondary schools; limits were to 
be placed on expenditure increases both at the 
state and local level; and the Legislature was to 
be authorized to raise additional revenue to meet 
the cost for school aid. The source of this 
revenue was not described in the initiative but 
it was generally acknowledged that a sales tax 
would be necessary.  [Ref. 2:p. 59]  
The initiative was passed and gave rise to new 
problems. Now that the state was paying for school aid, the 
general fund deficit grew.  In order to cover this new 
expense, the state adopted retail sales taxes and tried to 
adopt personal income taxes.  Governor Sunny Jim Rolph 
vetoed the personal income taxes.  It is important to note 
that the California State budget operated on a biennium.  
After Rolph died in office, Frank Merriam succeeded 
him as governor and then won the nomination in 1934. 
Merriam inherited a large budget deficit and, by 1935, the 
budget deficit had increased even further.   His solution 
was an increase in retail sales taxes from two percent to 
three percent and a personal income tax. [Ref. 2:p. 60)  The 
Legislature approved his requests, and California residents 
have been paying personal income taxes since then.   
B. THE EARL WARREN ERA 
Earl Warren was elected in 1943 and served three 
consecutive terms.  He inherited a state budget recovering 
from ten years of deficits (1931-1941). [Ref. 3:p. 7] World 
War II stimulated California’s economy, and, by 1943, the 
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general fund revenue-to-expenditure ratio was greater than 
one. Instead of increasing government spending, Governor 
Warren successfully advocated saving surpluses generated by 
the wartime economy.  As the surplus grew, Warren cut sales 
taxes from three to two-and-one-half percent and the 
maximum personal income tax rate from fifteen to six 
percent. [Ref. 3:pp. 11-12] According to an article by 
David Doerr in the Cal-Tax Digest, “By 1947, the state had 
sequestered $472 million in various reserve funds for 
emergency use.” [Ref. 3:p. 12] California state tax laws 
remained relatively unchanged until 1959, when Edmond G. 
“Pat” Brown took office. 
C. THE EDMOND G. “PAT” BROWN ERA 
Edmond G. “Pat” Brown became governor on January 5, 
1959. The surpluses accrued by Governor Warren had been 
used up during the years from 1955 through 1958.  During 
this time there were gross imbalances between revenue and 
expenditures caused by an increase in state funding for 
education.  The legislature chose not to raise personal 
income taxes or sales taxes; however, it did raise taxes on 
gasoline and car registrations from four-and-one-half cents 
to six cents per gallon and from six to eight dollars, 
respectively.  The revenues generated were not enough to 
cover the entire cost of the increased expenditures on 
education, and the reserve funds, or surplus, accumulated 
under Governor Warren were depleted. [Ref. 3:p. 13] 
Governor Brown faced budget deficits reminiscent of 
the Warren era.  Republicans favored cutting government 
spending, but Brown chose to increase taxes.  According to 
Doerr, “To fund his new budget, Governor Brown suggested a 
  7
$202 million tax increase, the largest such increase in 
nearly a quarter century.” [Ref. 4:p. 2] Central to his tax 
increases was the change to personal income taxes from the 
six-percent maximum set by Governor Warren to seven 
percent, the narrowing of tax brackets from $10,000 to 
$5000 for married couples filing jointly and from $5000 to 
$2500 for all others, and a reduction of personal 
exemptions.  These changes were intended to produce $60.7 
million dollars of revenue. [Ref. 4:p. 2] Personal income 
tax laws remained unchanged for the remainder of Brown's 
time in office.     
D. THE RONALD REAGAN ERA 
Ronald Reagan was elected Governor on January 2, 1967. 
Doerr describes the steps that Reagan took to cut 
government spending: 
He first ordered a hiring freeze, a 10-percent 
budget cut of all state agencies, and other 
expenditure reductions.  However, it soon became 
apparent that taxes would have to be raised 
substantially.  Mr. Reagan was only able to slow 
the rate of growth of the state’s general fund 
expenditures only 8 percent from 1966-1967 to 
1967-68, compared to 16 percent in the year 
prior). [Ref. 4:p. 2] 
Reagan's actions were not enough, however, and he 
chose to raise taxes to cover the gap between expenditures 
and revenue.  The maximum personal income tax was raised 
from seven to ten percent.  Tax brackets were narrowed once 
again, from $5000 to $4000 for joint and single returns.  
Governor Reagan passed several other tax increases not 
related to personal income taxes; these are beyond the 
scope of this thesis and will not be addressed. 
  8
 
E. BRACKET CREEP 
According to Taxopedia, a web-based tax information 
site, bracket creep occurs 
when inflation pushes income into higher tax 
brackets.  The result is no increase in real 
purchasing power but an increase in income tax 
payable. [Ref. 5] 
Bracket creep, if left unchecked, is a crafty means by 
which federal, state or local governments can collect 
additional revenues from taxpayers without explicitly 
raising income tax rates.   
Many features of personal income taxes are defined by 
fixed dollar amounts.  For instance, income taxes have 
various rates starting at different dollar amounts of 
income.  If these fixed amounts are not adjusted 
periodically, taxes can go up substantially simply because 
of inflation.  Over time, bracket creep tends to reduce the 
real value of other important features of the tax system, 
such as exemptions and standard deductions, as well.   
  9
Table 2.1 illustrates the effects of bracket creep and 
legislated tax rate increases in California for different 
levels of income and calculates the percentage increase in 
real income and marginal tax rates from 1958 dollars to 
1977 dollars.  For example, a married person filing a joint 
return earning $5000 in 1958 would be in the one-percent 
tax bracket and pay $50 in state taxes for the year.  That 
same $5000 in income equates to $10,484 in 1977 dollars.  
The $50 in taxes paid, inflation adjusted to 1977 dollars 
is now $105, assuming the person earned the same pay in 
real terms.  He pays $209 in taxes in 1977.  The percentage 
increase in real taxes paid is 100 percent, and the 
percentage increase in the marginal tax rate is 300 
percent.  This shows that a person making $5000 in 1958, 
assuming no increase in real pay, paid 100 percent more in 
state taxes on the same amount of income and experienced a 
300-percent increase in his or her marginal tax rate.  
Table 2.1. The Effects of Bracket Creep for Married 
Filing Joint Returns. 
 
 Married Filing Joint Returns     
Base     
 1958 
adjusted    From 1958 to1977 
Year Income Tax rate Tax paid 77$ Income Tax rate Tax paid % incr in real tax % incr in MTR
1958 $5,000 1% $50 $105 $10,484  4% $209  100% 300% 
 $10,000 1% $100 $209 $20,969  7% $778 271% 600% 
 $20,000 3% $300 $629 $41,938  11% $2863  355% 267% 
 $30,000 3% $600 $1258 $62,907  11% $5170 311% 267% 
 
The following tables are the historical personal 
income tables for California from 1935 to 1993 and the 
consumer price index from 1913 to 2001.  These tables were 
used for the calculations in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.2. Married Persons Filing Joint Returns. 
 
             
                          
               Taxable Income             
     (adjusted gross income less            Taxable Year         
   deductions and exemptions)  1935-42 1943-48a  1949-51 1952-58b 1959-66c 
                    
Up to $2,500 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
$2,500 to 5,000 1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  
5,000 to 7,500 2.0  1.0  2.0  1.0  2.0  
7,500 to 10,000 2.0  1.0  2.0  1.0  2.0  
10,000 to 12,500 3.0  2.0  3.0  2.0  3.0  
12,500 to 15,000 3.0  2.0  3.0  2.0  3.0  
15,000 to 20,000 4.0  3.0  4.0  2.0  4.0  
20,000 to 25,000 5.0  4.0  5.0  3.0  5.0  
25,000 to 30,000 6.0  5.0  6.0  3.0  6.0  
30,000 to 40,000 7.0  6.0  6.0  4.0  7.0  
40,000 to 50,000 8.0  6.0  6.0  5.0  7.0  
50,000 to 60,000 9.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
60,000 to 70,000 10.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
70,000 to 80,000 11.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
80,000 to 100,000 12.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
100,000 to 150,000 13.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
150,000 to 250,000 14.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
  250,000 and over 15.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
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            Taxable Year       
           Taxable Income*     1967-72d       1973e,f     
Up to $4,000   1.0%    1.0%    
$4,000 to 7,000  2.0    2.0    
7,000 to 10,000  3.0    3.0    
10,000 to 13,000  4.0    4.0    
13,000 to 16,000  5.0    5.0    
16,000 to 19,000  6.0    6.0    
19,000 to 22,000  7.0    7.0    
22,000 to 25,000  8.0    8.0    
25,000 to 28,000  9.0    9.0    
28,000 to 31,000  10.0    10.0    
31,000 and over  10.0    11.0    
               
               
           Taxable Income*            Taxable Year 1986       
Up to $3,420     0%      
$3,420 to 10,420    1      
10,420 to 15,620    2      
15,620 to 20,840    3      
20,840 to 26,160    4      
26,160 to 31,420    5      
31,420 to 36,660    6      
36,660 to 41,860    7      
41,860 to 47,120    8      
47,120 to 52,360    9      
52,360 to 57,580    10      
57,580 and over         11          
            
  
          Taxable Income*         Taxable Year 1987-90g     
Up to 7,300    1.0%      
7,300 to 17,300    2.0      
17,300 to 27,300    4.0      
27,300 to 37,900    6.0      
37,900 to 47,900    8.0      
47,900 and over    9.3      
           Taxable Income*         Taxable Year 1991-92h     
Up to $8,788     1.0%      
$8,788 to 20,828     2.0      
20,828 to 32,870     4.0      
32,870 to 45,632     6.0      
45,632 to 57,670     8.0      
57,670 to 200,000     9.3      
200,000 to 400,000     10.0      
400,000 and over     11.0      
           Taxable Income*            Taxable Year 1993       
Up to $9,332     1.0%      
$9,332 to 22,118     2.0      
22,118 to 34,906     4.0      
34,906 to 48,456     6.0      
48,456 to 61,240     8.0      
61,240 to 212,380     9.3      
  11
212,380 to 424,760     10.0      
424,760 and over     11.0      
 
Table 2.3.okSingle and Married Persons Filing Separate 
Returns. 
                      
             Taxable Income           
   (adjusted gross income less            Taxable Year     
   deductions and exemptions) 1935-421943-48a  1949-58 1959-66c
                
Up to $2,500 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
$2,500 to 5,000 1.0  1.0  1.0  2.0  
5,000 to 7,500 2.0  1.0  2.0  3.0  
7,500 to 10,000 2.0  1.0  2.0  4.0  
10,000 to 12,500 3.0  2.0  3.0  5.0  
12,500 to 15,000 3.0  2.0  3.0  6.0  
15,000 to 20,000 4.0  3.0  4.0  7.0  
20,000 to 25,000 5.0  4.0  5.0  7.0  
25,000 to 30,000 6.0  5.0  6.0  7.0  
30,000 to 40,000 7.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
40,000 to 50,000 8.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
50,000 to 60,000 9.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
60,000 to 70,000 10.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
70,000 to 80,000 11.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
80,000 to 100,000 12.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
100,000 to 150,000 13.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
150,000 to 250,000 14.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
  250,000 and over 15.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
            Taxable Year          
           Taxable Income*    1967-72d   1973e,f    
Up to $2,000   1.0% 1.0%    
$2,000 to 3,500  2.0  2.0    
3,500 to 5,000  3.0  3.0    
5,000 to 6,500  4.0  4.0    
6,500 to 8,000  5.0  5.0    
8,000 to 9,500  6.0  6.0    
9,500 to 11,000  7.0  7.0    
11,000 to 12,500  8.0  8.0    
12,500 to 14,000  9.0  9.0    
14,000 to 15,500  10.0  10.0    
15,500 and over  10.0 11.0    
             
             
           Taxable Income*                Taxable Year 1986   
Up to $1,710   0.0%      
$1,710 to 5,210  1.0      
5,210 to 7,810  2.0      
7,810 to 10,420  3.0      
10,420 to 13,080  4.0      
13,080 to 15,710  5.0      
15,710 to 18,330  6.0      
18,330 to 20,930  7.0      
20,930 to 23,560  8.0      
  12
23,560 to 26,180  9.0      
26,180 to 28,790  10.0      
28,790 and over     11.0          
           Taxable Income*              Taxable Year 1987-90g   
Up to $3,650   1.0%      
$3,650 to 8,650   2.0      
8,650 to 13,650   4.0      
13,650 to 18,950   6.0      
18,950 to 23,950   8.0      
23,950 and over   9.3     
           Taxable Income*              Taxable Year 1991-92h   
Up to $4,394   1.0%      
$4,394 to 10,414   2.0      
10,414 to 16,435   4.0      
16,435 to 22,816   6.0      
22,816 to 28,835   8.0      
28,835 to 100,000   9.3      
100,000 to 200,000   10.0      
200,000 and over   11.0      
           Taxable Income*                Taxable Year 1993   
Up to $4,666   1.0%      
$4,666 to 11,059   2.0      
11,059 to 17,453   4.0      
17,453 to 24,228   6.0      
24,228 to 30,620   8.0      
30,620 to 106,190   9.3      
106,190 to 212,380   10.0      
212,380 and over   11.0      
 
Table 2.4. Unmarried Heads of Household. 
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             Taxable Income           
   (adjusted gross income less         Taxable Year     
   deductions and exemptions) 1935-42 1943-48a  1949-58 1959-66c
                
Up to $2,500 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
$2,500 to 5,000 1.0  1.0  1.0  2.0  
5,000 to 7,500 2.0  1.0  2.0  3.0  
7,500 to 10,000 2.0  1.0  2.0  4.0  
10,000 to 12,500 3.0  2.0  3.0  5.0  
12,500 to 15,000 3.0  2.0  3.0  6.0  
15,000 to 20,000 4.0  3.0  4.0  7.0  
20,000 to 25,000 5.0  4.0  5.0  7.0  
25,000 to 30,000 6.0  5.0  6.0  7.0  
30,000 to 40,000 7.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
40,000 to 50,000 8.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
50,000 to 60,000 9.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
60,000 to 70,000 10.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
70,000 to 80,000 11.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
80,000 to 100,000 12.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
100,000 to 150,000 13.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
150,000 to 250,000 14.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
  250,000 and over 15.0  6.0  6.0  7.0  
           
              Taxable Year          
           Taxable Income* 1967-72d   1973e    1974f,i     
Up to $3,000 1% 1.0% 1.0%    
$3,000 to 4,000 2 2.0 1.0    
4,000 to 4,500 2 2.0 2.0    
4,500 to 6,000 3 3.0 2.0    
6,000 to 7,500 4 4.0 3.0    
7,500 to 9,000 5 5.0 4.0    
9,000 to 10,500 6 6.0 5.0    
10,500 to 12,000 7 7.0 6.0    
12,000 to 13,500 8 8.0 7.0    
13,500 to 15,000 9 9.0 8.0    
15,000 to 16,500 10 10.0 9.0    
16,500 to 18,000 10 11.0 10.0    
18,000 and over 10 11.0 11.0    
           Taxable Income*                Taxable Year 1986   
Up to $3,420   0.0%      
$3,420 to 10,410  1.0      
10,410 to 13,890  2.0      
13,890 to 16,530  3.0      
16,530 to 19,150  4.0      
19,150 to 21,780  5.0      
21,780 to 24,410  6.0      
24,410 to 27,020  7.0      
27,020 to 29,630  8.0      
29,630 to 32,260  9.0      
32,260 to 34,880  10.0      
34,880 and over     11.0          
           Taxable Income*             Taxable Year 1987-90g   
Up to $7,300   1.0%      
$7,300 to 17,300   2.0      
17,300 to 22,300   4.0      
22,300 to 27,600   6.0      
27,600 to 32,600   8.0      
32,600 and over   9.3     
           Taxable Income*             Taxable Year 1991-92h   
Up to $8,789   1.0%      
$8,789 to 20,829   2.0      
20,829 to 26,848   4.0      
26,848 to 33,229   6.0      
33,229 to 39,249   8.0      
39,249 to 136,115   9.3      
136,115 to 272,230   10.0      
272,230 and over   11.0      
           Taxable Income*                Taxable Year 1993   
Up to $9,333   1.0%      
$9,333 to 22,118   2.0      
22,118 to 28,510   4.0      
28,510 to 35,286   6.0      
35,286 to 41,679   8.0      
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41,679 to 144,540   9.3      
144,540 to 289,081   10.0      
289,081 and over   11.0      
Notes for Tables 2.2 through 2.4: 
*  Adjusted Gross Income less deductions. 
a. A temporary reduction in tax for lower income levels 
was effected in this period by widening the initial 
tax rate bracket from $5000 to $10000.  This temporary 
reduction was renewed in 1945, 1947 and 1948, but was 
allowed to lapse in 1949.  In addition, the maximum 
rate was reduced from %15 on amounts in excess of 
$250,000 to %6 on amounts in excess of $30,000. 
 
b. Income splitting on joint returns was first effective 
in this period.  Under this provision, married 
taxpayers who filed joint returns paid tax using a 
rate that was the same rate as the rate a single 
taxpayer would use on the same income.  This allowed 
married taxpayers to file one return, instead of 
splitting their income and filing separate returns to 
take advantage of a lower tax rate. 
 
c. The tax brackets were narrowed from $10,000 to $5000 
for married couples filing jointly and from $5000 to 
$2,500 for all others.  At the same time, the maximum 
rate was increased from six percent to seven percent. 
 
d. Tax brackets were narrowed and the tax rates increased 
to 10%.  Taxable income was redefined as adjusted 
gross income less deductions, rather than adjusted 
gross income less deductions, personal exemptions, and 
dependent exemptions (Stat. 1967, Ch. 963). 
 
A special 10% reduction in tax liabilities, maximum 
$100 for single individuals and $200 for married 
couples filing jointly, was effective for the 1969 
taxable year (Stats. 1969, Ch. 1464). 
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 A forgiveness tax credit of 20% was provided with 
respect to 1971 taxes, along with enactment of the 
withholding and declaration of estimated tax program, 
effective on January 1, 1972 (Stats. 1971, [First 
extraordinary Session], Ch. 1). 
 
e. The maximum tax rate was increased from 10% to 11% 
(Stats. 1971, [First Extraordinary], Ch.1).  A special 
income tax credit ranging from 20% to 100% of tax 
liability was effective for the 1973 taxable (Stats. 
1973, Ch. 296). 
 
f. Tax brackets were indexed at a rate of 5.222% for 
1978, 6.88% for 1979, 17.33% for 1980, 8.26% for 1981, 
9.32% for 1982, -1.2% for 1983, 4.6% for 1984 and for 
1985, and 3.5% for 1986.  Indexing was suspended for 
1987.  The brackets were set by AB 53 (Stats. 1987, 
Ch. 1138).  For 1988, indexing was reestablished at 
4.6%.  Indexing was 5.3% for 1989, 4.8% for 1990, 4.3% 
for 1991, 3.6% for 1992, and 2.5% for 1993.  Indexing 
reflects the June to June change in the California 
Consumer Price Index less 3% for 1978 and 1979 and 
full indexing for 1980 and subsequent years (Stats. 
1978, Ch. 569). 
 
g. The maximum tax rate was lowered from 11% to 9.3% 
effective for the 1987 taxable year.  The number of 
tax brackets was reduced from 11 to 6.  Also replaced 
the preference tax with a 7% alternative minimum tax 
(Stats. 1987, Ch. 1138). 
 
h. A 10% and 11% tax rate were added, increasing the 
maximum tax rate from 9.3%, effective for the 1991 
through 1995 taxable years (Stats. 1991, Ch. 117). 
 
i. Tax brackets were eased for heads of household 








       CPI-U 
 Base year is chained; 
   1982-1984 = 100 
     
                Annual Percent Change   
             Annual         (Rate of     
Year      Average Inflation)    
      
1913  9.9    --    
1914        10.0   1.0    
1915 10.1   1.0    
1916 10.9   7.9    
1917 12.8  17.4    
1918 15.1  18.0    
1919 17.3  14.6    
1920 20.0          15.6    
1921 17.9 -10.5    
1922 16.8  -6.1    
1923 17.1   1.8    
1924 17.1   0.0    
1925 17.5   2.3    
1926 17.7   1.1    
1927 17.4  -1.7    
1928 17.1  -1.7    
1929 17.1   0.0    
1930 16.7  -2.3    
1931 15.2  -9.0    
1932 13.7  -9.9    
1933 13.0  -5.1    
1934 13.4   3.1    
1935 13.7   2.2    
1936 13.9   1.5    
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1937 14.4   3.6    
1938 14.1  -2.1    
1939 13.9  -1.4    
1940 14.0   0.7    
1941 14.7   5.0    
1942 16.3  10.9    
1943 17.3   6.1    
1944 17.6   1.7    
1945 18.0   2.3    
1946 19.5   8.3    
1947 22.3  14.4    
1948 24.1   8.1    
1949 23.8  -1.2    
1950 24.1   1.3    
1951 26.0   7.9    
1952 26.5   1.9    
1953 26.7   0.8    
1954 26.9   0.7    
1955 26.8  -0.4    
1956 27.2   1.5    
1957 28.1   3.3    
1958 28.9   2.8    
1959 29.1   0.7    
1960 29.6   1.7    
1961 29.9   1.0    
1962 30.2   1.0    
1963 30.6   1.3    
1964 31.0   1.3    
1965 31.5   1.6    
1966 32.4   2.9    
1967 33.4   3.1    
1968 34.8   4.2    
1969 36.7   5.5    
1970 38.8   5.7    
1971 40.5   4.4    
1972 41.8   3.2    
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1973 44.4   6.2    
1974 49.3  11.0    
1975 53.8   9.1    
1976 56.9   5.8    
1977 60.6   6.5    
1978 65.2   7.6    
1979 72.6  11.3    
1980 82.4  13.5    
1981 90.9  10.3    
1982 96.5   6.2    
1983 99.6   3.2    
1984       103.9   4.3    
1985       107.6   3.6    
1986       109.6   1.9       
1987       113.6   3.6       
1988       118.3   4.1       
1989       124.0   4.8       
1990       130.7   5.4       
1991       136.2   4.2       
1992       140.3   3.0       
1993       144.5   3.0       
1994       148.2   2.6       
1995       152.4   2.8       
1996       156.9   2.9       
1997       160.5   2.3       
1998       163.0   1.6       
1999       166.6   2.2       
2000       172.2   3.4 
2001       177.1           2.8 
2002       179.3*         1.2 
*An estimate for 2002 is based on the change in the 
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III. THE EFFECTS OF STATE INCOME TAXES ON THE 
ELASTICITY OF INCOME 
A. BACKGROUND AND GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION OF DEADWEIGHT LOSS 
Martin Feldstein, Harvard University professor of 
economics and president of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, used the Social Security tax to calculate the 
deadweight loss of the Social Security program. This 
chapter uses Feldstein’s methods and formulas—substituting 
California state income taxes for Social Security taxes—to 
calculate the deadweight loss and show how much greater it 
is when state taxes are imposed in addition to federal 
taxes on wages.  The calculations for deadweight loss 
normally start with a zero tax base and add a tax to 
calculate deadweight loss.   
Figure 3.1 illustrates a labor market at equilibrium, 
without federal income taxes. The employer surplus is the 
area below the demand curve down to the wage paid and out 
to the quantity of labor supplied (triangle ABD).  The 
employee surplus is the area above the supply curve up to 
the wage paid and out to the quantity of labor supplied 










Figure 3.1. Labor Market at Equilibrium. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the same market with federal income 
taxes imposed on wages.  The supply curve S has shifted up 
to S1.  The rectangle HBDF is the revenue collected by the 
federal government.  The triangle ABH is the new employer 
surplus, and the triangle FDE is the new employee surplus.  
The triangle BCD is the deadweight loss caused by the 
federal tax.  It is not collected as revenue by the 
government; nor is it employee or employer surplus.  This 















Figure 3.2. Labor Market with FIT. 
 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the effect of imposing a state 
income tax in addition to a federal tax on wages.  The 
total deadweight loss, represented by triangle BDF, is much 
larger.  Deadweight loss caused by the state income tax is 
the trapezoid BCEF.  The state revenue collected is the 
rectangle LBMJ.  The federal revenue collected was the 
rectangle KCEI and is now the much smaller rectangle JMFH.  
Employer and employee surpluses are even smaller—i.e., the 
triangles ABL and HFG, respectively.  The state income tax 
has exacerbated the deadweight loss from a federal tax on 
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wages.  Once again, this much larger triangle, BDF, is 
revenue neither collected by the state or federal 
















S11 (with FIT and SIT)
N
 
Figure 3.3. Labor Market with FIT and SIT. 
 
B. CALCULATING DEADWEIGHT LOSS (DWL) 
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Graphs are a simple way to visually demonstrate how 
taxes create deadweight loss.  The next step is to quantify 
the DWL by using the same equation Feldstein used to 
calculate the DWL caused by a Social Security tax.  
Feldstein borrowed the equation, written in 1964 by 
economist Arnold Harberger and modified by economist Edgar 
Browning in a piece written for the American Economic 
Review titled, “On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation.”  
Feldstein explains how and why Browning modified the 
original equation for deadweight loss: 
Browning (1987) showed that, when the relevant 
behavioral elasticity is measured in the presence 
of the tax, the original Hargberger (1964) 
formula for the deadweight loss of a tax with 
marginal tax rate t on a wage base of wL must be 
modified to DWL=0.5 ε t2 wL/(1-t) where ε is the 
compensated elasticity of the tax base (wL) with 
respect to the marginal net of tax share, 1-t.  
The increase in the deadweight loss because the 
marginal tax rate is at t2 rather than t1 is 
therefore ∆ DWL= 0.5 ε (t22 – t12)wL/ (1-t2). [Ref. 
6:p. 9] 
In the following tables, the modified formula DWL=0.5 ε 
t2 wL/(1-t) was used to calculate the deadweight loss from a 
state income tax on wages in 1958 and 1977.  The 1958 
dollar figures are inflation adjusted to 1977 dollars to 
facilitate comparison of same-year dollars.  The 
calculations for ∆ DWL were accomplished by calculating the 
DWL in 1958, inflation adjusting to 1977 dollars and then 
subtracting that DWL from 1977's DWL, as opposed to using 
the equation above—i.e., ∆ DWL= 0.5 ε (t22 – t12)wL/(1-t2).  
The purpose of the tables is to show how bracket creep 
exacerbates DWL from taxation. 
Table 3.1, the first of four tables, uses an 
elasticity of .3.  As will be demonstrated, DWL increases 
as elasticity increases. 
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wL58 58TR wL77 77TR Hr/yr E FIT t1 t1^ 2 t2 t2^ 2 1-t1 1-t2 adj dwl58 dwl77 adj Rev t1 Rev t2 D Rev D dwl Ddwl/Drev
1,000$       1% 2,097$          1% 2000 0.3 15% 16% 2.56% 16% 2.560% 84% 84% 9.59$            9.59$             336$           335.50           -              -$           0.00%
3,000$       1% 6,291$          2% 2000 0.3 15% 16% 2.56% 17% 2.890% 84% 83% 28.76$          32.86$           1,007$        1,069.41        62.91          4.10$         6.51%
4,000$       1% 8,388$          3% 2000 0.3 15% 16% 2.56% 18% 3.240% 84% 82% 38.34$          49.71$           1,342$        1,509.76        167.75        11.37$       6.78%
5,000$       1% 10,484$        4% 2000 0.3 15% 16% 2.56% 19% 3.610% 84% 81% 47.93$          70.09$           1,678$        1,992.04        314.53        22.16$       7.05%
7,000$       1% 14,678$        5% 2000 0.3 15% 16% 2.56% 20% 4.000% 84% 80% 67.10$          110.09$         2,349$        2,935.64        587.13        42.99$       7.32%
9,000$       1% 18,872$        6% 2000 0.3 15% 16% 2.56% 21% 4.410% 84% 79% 86.27$          158.02$         3,020$        3,963.11        943.60        71.75$       7.60%
10,000$     1% 20,969$        7% 2000 0.3 15% 16% 2.56% 22% 4.840% 84% 78% 95.86$          195.17$         3,355$        4,613.15        1,258.13     99.31$       7.89%
12,000$     2% 25,163$        8% 2000 0.3 15% 17% 2.89% 23% 5.290% 83% 77% 131.42$        259.31$         4,278$        5,787.40        1,509.76     127.88$     8.47%
13,000$     2% 27,260$        9% 2000 0.3 15% 17% 2.89% 24% 5.760% 83% 76% 142.37$        309.90$         4,634$        6,542.28        1,908.17     167.52$     8.78%
14,000$     2% 29,356$        10% 2000 0.3 15% 17% 2.89% 25% 6.250% 83% 75% 153.33$        366.96$         4,991$        7,339.10        2,348.51     213.63$     9.10%
15,000$     2% 31,453$        11% 2000 0.3 15% 17% 2.89% 26% 6.760% 83% 74% 164.28$        431.00$         5,347$        8,177.85        2,830.80     266.72$     9.42%
17,000$     2% 35,647$        11% 2000 0.3 15% 17% 2.89% 26% 6.760% 83% 74% 186.18$        488.46$         6,060$        9,268.24        3,208.24     302.28$     9.42%
20,000$     2% 41,938$        11% 2000 0.3 15% 17% 2.89% 26% 6.760% 83% 74% 219.04$        574.66$         7,129$        10,903.81      3,774.39     355.62$     9.42%
22,000$     3% 46,131$        11% 2000 0.3 15% 18% 3.24% 26% 6.760% 82% 74% 273.41$        632.13$         8,304$        11,994.19      3,690.52     358.71$     9.72%
25,000$     3% 52,422$        11% 2000 0.3 15% 18% 3.24% 26% 6.760% 82% 74% 310.70$        718.33$         9,436$        13,629.76      4,193.77     407.63$     9.72%
35,000$     4% 73,391$        11% 2000 0.3 15% 19% 3.61% 26% 6.760% 81% 74% 490.63$        1,005.66$      13,944$      19,081.66      5,137.37     515.02$     10.03%
45,000$     5% 94,360$        11% 2000 0.3 15% 20% 4.00% 26% 6.760% 80% 74% 707.70$        1,292.99$      18,872$      24,533.56      5,661.59     585.29$     10.34%
55,000$     6% 115,329$      11% 2000 0.3 15% 21% 4.41% 26% 6.760% 79% 74% 965.70$        1,580.32$      24,219$      29,985.47      5,766.44     614.62$     10.66%  
Table 3.1. Deadweight Loss from State Taxes with an 
Elasticity of .3. 
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Refer to Table 3.1.  Throughout all the analysis we 
assume, for computational simplicity, that the marginal tax 
rate is also the average tax rate on taxable income.  In 
other words, we assume a flat tax rate.  A married person 
filing a joint return in 1958 with a taxable income of 
$15,000 is in a marginal state income tax (SIT) bracket of 
two percent.  Therefore, two percent of the person's 
incremental income is collected for SIT.  This person pays 
a marginal federal income tax rate (FIT) of 15 percent; 
thus, his combined total tax rate, SIT + FIT, is 17 
percent.  Assuming that he does not receive any real pay 
increases, after adjusting for inflation he earns $31,453 
in 1977 dollars and is now paying an 11 percent SIT.  The 
percentage increase in his marginal tax rate is 450%. The 
DWL for 1958 and inflation-adjusted to 1977 is $164.28.  
The DWL for 1977 is $431 and the delta, or increase in DWL 
from 1958 to 1977, is $266.72.  The revenue collected in 
1958 and adjusted for inflation to 1977 is $5,347.  Revenue 
for 1977 is $8,177.  The delta, or increase in revenue from 
1958 to 1977, is $2831.  By dividing the delta DWL by the 
delta revenue, the DWL as percentage of revenue collected 
is calculated at 9.42 percent.  This means that it costs 
9.42 cents for every additional dollar collected in revenue 
from this person, or that 9.42 cents on the dollar is lost 
to DWL.  Notice that for a person in the highest marginal 
SIT bracket for 1977, 11 percent, it costs more than ten 
cents for every dollar collected as revenue. 
Table 3.2 is the same as Table 3.1 with the exception 
of elasticity.  If elasticity is increased to .5, the 
incremental DWL as percentage of incremental revenue 
collected is now 15.70 percent and almost 18 percent for 
the highest marginal tax bracket.  And for Tables 3.3 and 
3.4, the incremental DWL as percentage of incremental 
revenue collected for the person earning $15,000 in 1958 
and for a person in the highest marginal tax bracket are 
21.98/31.41 and 24.87/35.53 percent, respectively. 
 
wL58 58TR wL77 77TR Hr/yr E FIT t1 t1^ 2 t2 t2^ 2 1-t1 1-t2 adj dwl58 dwl77 adj Rev t1 Rev t2 D Rev D dwl Ddwl/Drev
1,000$     1% 2,097$       1% 2000 0.5 15% 16% 2.56% 16% 2.560% 84% 84% 15.98$        15.98$        335.50$        335.50$        -$            -$            0.00%
3,000$     1% 6,291$       2% 2000 0.5 15% 16% 2.56% 17% 2.890% 84% 83% 47.93$        54.76$        1,006.51$     1,069.41$     62.91$        6.83$          10.86%
4,000$     1% 8,388$       3% 2000 0.5 15% 16% 2.56% 18% 3.240% 84% 82% 63.91$        82.85$        1,342.01$     1,509.76$     167.75$      18.95$        11.30%
5,000$     1% 10,484$     4% 2000 0.5 15% 16% 2.56% 19% 3.610% 84% 81% 79.88$        116.82$      1,677.51$     1,992.04$     314.53$      36.94$        11.74%
7,000$     1% 14,678$     5% 2000 0.5 15% 16% 2.56% 20% 4.000% 84% 80% 111.83$      183.48$      2,348.51$     2,935.64$     587.13$      71.64$        12.20%
9,000$     1% 18,872$     6% 2000 0.5 15% 16% 2.56% 21% 4.410% 84% 79% 143.79$      263.37$      3,019.52$     3,963.11$     943.60$      119.59$      12.67%
10,000$   1% 20,969$     7% 2000 0.5 15% 16% 2.56% 22% 4.840% 84% 78% 159.76$      325.29$      3,355.02$     4,613.15$     1,258.13$   165.52$      13.16%
12,000$   2% 25,163$     8% 2000 0.5 15% 17% 2.89% 23% 5.290% 83% 77% 219.04$      432.18$      4,277.65$     5,787.40$     1,509.76$   213.14$      14.12%
13,000$   2% 27,260$     9% 2000 0.5 15% 17% 2.89% 24% 5.760% 83% 76% 237.29$      516.50$      4,634.12$     6,542.28$     1,908.17$   279.21$      14.63%
14,000$   2% 29,356$     10% 2000 0.5 15% 17% 2.89% 25% 6.250% 83% 75% 255.54$      611.59$      4,990.59$     7,339.10$     2,348.51$   356.05$      15.16%
15,000$   2% 31,453$     11% 2000 0.5 15% 17% 2.89% 26% 6.760% 83% 74% 273.80$      718.33$      5,347.06$     8,177.85$     2,830.80$   444.53$      15.70%
17,000$   2% 35,647$     11% 2000 0.5 15% 17% 2.89% 26% 6.760% 83% 74% 310.30$      814.10$      6,060.00$     9,268.24$     3,208.24$   503.80$      15.70%
20,000$   2% 41,938$     11% 2000 0.5 15% 17% 2.89% 26% 6.760% 83% 74% 365.06$      957.77$      7,129.41$     10,903.81$   3,774.39$   592.71$      15.70%
22,000$   3% 46,131$     11% 2000 0.5 15% 18% 3.24% 26% 6.760% 82% 74% 455.69$      1,053.54$   8,303.67$     11,994.19$   3,690.52$   597.85$      16.20%
25,000$   3% 52,422$     11% 2000 0.5 15% 18% 3.24% 26% 6.760% 82% 74% 517.83$      1,197.21$   9,435.99$     13,629.76$   4,193.77$   679.38$      16.20%
35,000$   4% 73,391$     11% 2000 0.5 15% 19% 3.61% 26% 6.760% 81% 74% 817.72$      1,676.09$   13,944.29$   19,081.66$   5,137.37$   858.37$      16.71%
45,000$   5% 94,360$     11% 2000 0.5 15% 20% 4.00% 26% 6.760% 80% 74% 1,179.50$   2,154.98$   18,871.97$   24,533.56$   5,661.59$   975.48$      17.23%
55,000$   6% 115,329$   11% 2000 0.5 15% 21% 4.41% 26% 6.760% 79% 74% 1,609.49$   2,633.86$   24,219.03$   29,985.47$   5,766.44$   1,024.37$   17.76%  
Table 3.2. Deadweight Loss from State Taxes with an 
Elasticity of .5. 
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wL58 58TR wL77 77TR Hr/yr E FIT t1 t1^ 2 t2 t2^ 2 1-t1 1-t2 dwl58 dwl77 Rev t1 Rev t2 D Rev D dwl Ddwl/Drev
1,000$     1% 2,097$       1% 2000 0.7 15% 16% 2.56% 16% 2.560% 84% 84% 22.37$        22.37$        335.50$        335.50$        -$            -$            0.00%
3,000$     1% 6,291$       2% 2000 0.7 15% 16% 2.56% 17% 2.890% 84% 83% 67.10$        76.66$        1,006.51$     1,069.41$     62.91$        9.56$          15.20%
4,000$     1% 8,388$       3% 2000 0.7 15% 16% 2.56% 18% 3.240% 84% 82% 89.47$        115.99$      1,342.01$     1,509.76$     167.75$      26.53$        15.81%
5,000$     1% 10,484$     4% 2000 0.7 15% 16% 2.56% 19% 3.610% 84% 81% 111.83$      163.54$      1,677.51$     1,992.04$     314.53$      51.71$        16.44%
7,000$     1% 14,678$     5% 2000 0.7 15% 16% 2.56% 20% 4.000% 84% 80% 156.57$      256.87$      2,348.51$     2,935.64$     587.13$      100.30$      17.08%
9,000$     1% 18,872$     6% 2000 0.7 15% 16% 2.56% 21% 4.410% 84% 79% 201.30$      368.72$      3,019.52$     3,963.11$     943.60$      167.42$      17.74%
10,000$   1% 20,969$     7% 2000 0.7 15% 16% 2.56% 22% 4.840% 84% 78% 223.67$      455.40$      3,355.02$     4,613.15$     1,258.13$   231.73$      18.42%
12,000$   2% 25,163$     8% 2000 0.7 15% 17% 2.89% 23% 5.290% 83% 77% 306.65$      605.05$      4,277.65$     5,787.40$     1,509.76$   298.40$      19.76%
13,000$   2% 27,260$     9% 2000 0.7 15% 17% 2.89% 24% 5.760% 83% 76% 332.20$      723.09$      4,634.12$     6,542.28$     1,908.17$   390.89$      20.49%
14,000$   2% 29,356$     10% 2000 0.7 15% 17% 2.89% 25% 6.250% 83% 75% 357.76$      856.23$      4,990.59$     7,339.10$     2,348.51$   498.47$      21.22%
15,000$   2% 31,453$     11% 2000 0.7 15% 17% 2.89% 26% 6.760% 83% 74% 383.31$      1,005.66$   5,347.06$     8,177.85$     2,830.80$   622.34$      21.98%
17,000$   2% 35,647$     11% 2000 0.7 15% 17% 2.89% 26% 6.760% 83% 74% 434.42$      1,139.74$   6,060.00$     9,268.24$     3,208.24$   705.32$      21.98%
20,000$   2% 41,938$     11% 2000 0.7 15% 17% 2.89% 26% 6.760% 83% 74% 511.08$      1,340.87$   7,129.41$     10,903.81$   3,774.39$   829.79$      21.98%
22,000$   3% 46,131$     11% 2000 0.7 15% 18% 3.24% 26% 6.760% 82% 74% 637.96$      1,474.96$   8,303.67$     11,994.19$   3,690.52$   837.00$      22.68%
25,000$   3% 52,422$     11% 2000 0.7 15% 18% 3.24% 26% 6.760% 82% 74% 724.96$      1,676.09$   9,435.99$     13,629.76$   4,193.77$   951.13$      22.68%
35,000$   4% 73,391$     11% 2000 0.7 15% 19% 3.61% 26% 6.760% 81% 74% 1,144.81$   2,346.53$   13,944.29$   19,081.66$   5,137.37$   1,201.72$   23.39%
45,000$   5% 94,360$     11% 2000 0.7 15% 20% 4.00% 26% 6.760% 80% 74% 1,651.30$   3,016.97$   18,871.97$   24,533.56$   5,661.59$   1,365.67$   24.12%
55,000$   6% 115,329$   11% 2000 0.7 15% 21% 4.41% 26% 6.760% 79% 74% 2,253.29$   3,687.40$   24,219.03$   29,985.47$   5,766.44$   1,434.11$   24.87%  
Table 3.3. Deadweight Loss from State Taxes with an 
Elasticity of .7. 
 
wL58 58TR wL77 77TR Hr/yr E FIT t1 t1^ 2 t2 t2^ 2 1-t1 1-t2 adj dwl58 dwl77 adj Rev t1 Rev t2 D Rev D dwl Ddwl/Drev
1,000$     1% 2,097$       1% 2000 1 15% 16% 2.56% 16% 2.560% 84% 84% 31.95$        31.95$        336$        335.50        -            -$            0.00%
3,000$     1% 6,291$       2% 2000 1 15% 16% 2.56% 17% 2.890% 84% 83% 95.86$        109.52$      1,007$     1,069.41     62.91        13.66$        21.72%
4,000$     1% 8,388$       3% 2000 1 15% 16% 2.56% 18% 3.240% 84% 82% 127.81$      165.71$      1,342$     1,509.76     167.75      37.89$        22.59%
5,000$     1% 10,484$     4% 2000 1 15% 16% 2.56% 19% 3.610% 84% 81% 159.76$      233.63$      1,678$     1,992.04     314.53      73.87$        23.49%
7,000$     1% 14,678$     5% 2000 1 15% 16% 2.56% 20% 4.000% 84% 80% 223.67$      366.96$      2,349$     2,935.64     587.13      143.29$      24.40%
9,000$     1% 18,872$     6% 2000 1 15% 16% 2.56% 21% 4.410% 84% 79% 287.57$      526.74$      3,020$     3,963.11     943.60      239.17$      25.35%
10,000$   1% 20,969$     7% 2000 1 15% 16% 2.56% 22% 4.840% 84% 78% 319.53$      650.57$      3,355$     4,613.15     1,258.13   331.05$      26.31%
12,000$   2% 25,163$     8% 2000 1 15% 17% 2.89% 23% 5.290% 83% 77% 438.07$      864.35$      4,278$     5,787.40     1,509.76   426.28$      28.24%
13,000$   2% 27,260$     9% 2000 1 15% 17% 2.89% 24% 5.760% 83% 76% 474.58$      1,032.99$   4,634$     6,542.28     1,908.17   558.41$      29.26%
14,000$   2% 29,356$     10% 2000 1 15% 17% 2.89% 25% 6.250% 83% 75% 511.08$      1,223.18$   4,991$     7,339.10     2,348.51   712.10$      30.32%
15,000$   2% 31,453$     11% 2000 1 15% 17% 2.89% 26% 6.760% 83% 74% 547.59$      1,436.65$   5,347$     8,177.85     2,830.80   889.06$      31.41%
17,000$   2% 35,647$     11% 2000 1 15% 17% 2.89% 26% 6.760% 83% 74% 620.60$      1,628.20$   6,060$     9,268.24     3,208.24   1,007.60$   31.41%
20,000$   2% 41,938$     11% 2000 1 15% 17% 2.89% 26% 6.760% 83% 74% 730.12$      1,915.53$   7,129$     10,903.81   3,774.39   1,185.41$   31.41%
22,000$   3% 46,131$     11% 2000 1 15% 18% 3.24% 26% 6.760% 82% 74% 911.38$      2,107.09$   8,304$     11,994.19   3,690.52   1,195.71$   32.40%
25,000$   3% 52,422$     11% 2000 1 15% 18% 3.24% 26% 6.760% 82% 74% 1,035.66$   2,394.42$   9,436$     13,629.76   4,193.77   1,358.76$   32.40%
35,000$   4% 73,391$     11% 2000 1 15% 19% 3.61% 26% 6.760% 81% 74% 1,635.44$   3,352.18$   13,944$   19,081.66   5,137.37   1,716.74$   33.42%
45,000$   5% 94,360$     11% 2000 1 15% 20% 4.00% 26% 6.760% 80% 74% 2,359.00$   4,309.95$   18,872$   24,533.56   5,661.59   1,950.95$   34.46%
55,000$   6% 115,329$   11% 2000 1 15% 21% 4.41% 26% 6.760% 79% 74% 3,218.99$   5,267.72$   24,219$   29,985.47   5,766.44   2,048.73$   35.53%  
Table 3.4. Deadweight Loss from State Taxes with an 
Elasticity of 1. 
 
The worst-case scenario, or the scenario that creates 
the most extra waste as a percentage of extra revenue 
collected, is for a person in the highest marginal tax 
bracket with an elasticity of 1.  It costs more than one 
dollar to collect three dollars in revenue from this 





One of the major factors in the location of economic 
activity is the tax system in that location.  All other 
things equal, the lower the tax rate in an area, the more 
attractive the area is for economic activity.  This matters 
for location across states, because movement from one state 
to another is relatively low cost.  The fact that workers 
can move from California to Nevada, for example, means that 
wages net of taxes will tend to equalize, which means that 
wages net of taxes will tend to be higher in the high-tax-
rate state.  This fact, in turn, means that production will 
be more expensive in the high-tax state.  This is 
particularly relevant for defense production and even 
location of military bases, because the Department of 
Defense (DoD) often has the option of choosing one state 
over another. 
Bracket creep, if left unchecked, will cause 
deadweight to continue to grow.  It is unrealistic to 
expect state taxes to go away entirely.  But deadweight 
loss incurred by over-taxation due to bracket creep can be 
minimized.  Industries, especially defense related 
industries, do have options for locating plants, companies 
and other defense related service.  The amount of taxes 
Californians pay due to bracket creep affects the wage 
levels of employees.  Defense industries looking for a 
future location, or deciding whether or not to remain in 
California must take wages--and therefore state income tax 
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